This book is about international human rights norms with respect to violence against women. It is specifically concerned with finding norms relating to intersectionality to understand how vast or sparse is the protection against gender-based violence suffered not merely because of gender, but also because of race, color, ethnicity, religion, region, class, disability, sexual orientation etc. The book engages with this aim via three courses-first, setting out the theoretical and practical implications of intersectionality for violence against women; second, gauging how far these are incorporated in international human rights law; and finally, analyzing case studies of intersectional gender violence.
Lorena Sosa opens the book with a fitting thought: that violence against women in international law has primarily been understood in terms of gender. She shows, rightly so, that the category of "gender" has become increasingly problematic in that it embodies very specific understandings, including rigid boundaries between biological categories of male-female and a heteronormative character of patriarchy. Intersectionality, on the other hand, throws the diversity of experiences of gender-based violence in sharp relief. It fundamentally questions the idea that gender-based violence can be understood regardless of differences based on race, religion, caste, class, sexual orientation, disability etc. Sosa highlights the growing recognition of this idea in international human rights law in the last few decades and thus, the necessity of understanding what intersectionality is or does. Sosa offers this account in Chapter Two, which aims to serve as the theoretical guide for the legal analysis in the rest of the book. Essentially, she points to the overarching idea that while discrimination may not be fully captured by a single ground or personal characteristic, intersectionality may help appreciate interlocking systems of disadvantage. She supplements this idea with three propositions about intersectionality: that it highlights the socio-structural nature of inequality; that it is structural rather than individual; and that it creates new and different forms of discrimination. These propositions are further supplemented by a number of principles: that identitycategories in intersectionality are diverse from within; that these categories are constantly changing or dynamic; and that there is no necessary hierarchy between categories. While each of these overarching notions, propositions and principles are attractive, Sosa does not offer them as either necessary or sufficient for a theoretical account of intersectionality. This though is a common complaint about intersectionality, that it lacks a certain analytical depth for being characterized as a theory at all, 1 something which Sosa argues it certainly is. While I too would readily agree that intersectionality meets the standard of a coherent theory, more is required to be able to substantiate such a claim. Similarly, the justification for the typology of intersectionality theories, as divided into group-centered or dynamic-centered, may need to be spelled out. It may be that both groupbased and systems-based approaches to intersectionality are equally plausible, but the natural question that arises is whether all approaches to intersectionality can be imagined as one or the other, or if there are approaches which do not necessarily fit either. The grounds-based approach of discrimination law, for example, may seem to refer to either or both at the same time-referring to certain disadvantaged groups or dynamics of disadvantage in turn or both of them together. In fact, Kimberlé Crenshaw's own work seems to do both, by referring to broader dynamics of oppression while focusing on Black women as a discrete group. Sosa's classification of Crenshaw's work as mainly categorical and lacking a systematic appreciation of the dynamics of disadvantage is thus suspect. A point often missed, is located in an important footnote in Crenshaw's 1991 piece, which is worth quoting in full:
I consider intersectionality a provisional concept linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory. In mapping the intersections of race and gender, the concept does engage dominant assumptions that race and gender are essentially separate categories. By tracing the categories to their intersections, I hope to suggest a methodology that will ultimately disrupt the tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable. While the primary intersections that I explore here are between race and gender, the concept can and should be expanded by factoring in issues such as class, sexual orientation, age, and color. It is clear that Crenshaw did not intend to limit intersectionality to race and gender or Black women for that matter. As a concept and as a methodology, she hoped for it to be much more. Choosing Black women as the subject of her analysis for applying the concept and the methodology does not quite limit the normative roots of intersectionality. The move in Chapter Two to air the critiques of intersectionality theory seems to proceed from a premise which is partial in appreciating the provisional nature of the theory it is intending to critique. Here, a disciplinary distinction may also be noted. It is not possible to look at works engaging with intersectionality or its critiques as necessarily relating to the same canon or field at all. Crenshaw's own work, especially her 1989 piece, was squarely a critique of discrimination law, through critical race feminism, critical legal theory and postmodern theory.
3 Similarly, Ange-Marie Hancock's contribution makes a fine job of historical 4 Perhaps their unique positions explain some of the differences in how they conceive intersectionality. One may consider these differences, not as differences in what intersectionality is studying-categories or systems-but simply as how it is studying forms of disadvantage suffered by people. In that sense, the divisions between intersectionalists seem contrived, if only at the level of how "the bourgeoning field of intersectionality studies" is organized.
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The discussion in the book plays on these apparent differences without questioning their grounding as "differences" per se.
At the end of Chapter Two, what is more convincing is Sosa's selection of intersectionality-related principles which she applies to violence against women. These suggest that, first, violence against women is a result of multiple inequalities; second, it is structural; third, it takes place in multiple domains, including family, workplace and educational institutions; and fourth, women who are located at the intersection of two or more social categories are more vulnerable to violence. While these principles seem reasonable enough, I am not sure how they flow from the specific principles identified earlier in the chapter. But perhaps works on intersectionality do not all need to identify an irreducible core of intersectionality in order to apply some of its principles. Sosa's work may fall in this category. I would thus read the general discussion on intersectionality not as a restatement of the theory as theory, but of how the field is organized, including its many different versions, critiques and defenses. That itself is rather helpful for a project of this kind, which applies intersectionality theory to a particular issue at hand, i.e., violence against women in international law.
In Chapter Three, Sosa gives a comprehensive overview of the human rights norms attending to the issue of violence against women. Here, Sosa gives a roundup of both hard and soft law, including a justification for using the latter in responding to gender violence. The discussion then moves on to the classification of substantive obligations in respect of gender violence, including the distinction between negative and positive obligations, obligations to "respect," "protect," and "fulfill" rights, and obligations of results or means. There is also an extended engagement with state responsibility for acts of private individuals and due diligence obligations which arise therein. Sosa makes an important point here: that the call for extending due diligence obligations from individual cases to systemic issues does not accord with the idea of positive obligations, which is now firmly rooted in human rights law. Nonetheless, due diligence as a broad standard applied by courts and other bodies may be "instrumental in the adoption and assessment of an intersectional approach to [ 7 Sosa presents her observations from a range of interactions with survivors, service providers and representatives of associations working with Romani women. She spells out the differences in perceptions of gender, ethnicity, religion and socioeconomic class in Romani women's experiences of intimate partner violence. In spite of these differences, Romani women rarely seek out the specialized services either within or beyond their communities to help deal with intimate partner violence. Instead it seems their differences essentially leave Romani women without much support despite the services available to them in principle. However, not all available 7. Id. at 174. services are attuned to these differences or to intersectionality. Sosa argues that an appreciation of differences is in fact seen as antithetic to the principle of equality in the Spanish Constitution.
8
Formal equality thus stands in the way of actually addressing Romani women's experiences of violence. Sosa repeats this empirical study from the perspective of indigenous and migrant women in Argentina. She comes to a similar conclusion, that although differences of indigenous and migrant status make a difference to a survivor's experience of intimate partner violence, these are generally disregarded as causally relevant to it and are in fact used to "naturalize" or justify it.
9 This of course, is regardless of the state's commitment to equality and an avowedly strong conviction that domestic violence is universal and cuts across class, race and ethnicity. 10 The account of what various forms of violence against women really look like would have been welcome a bit earlier.
A pithy central example of intersectional gender violence would have bridged the gap between law and reality and would have elevated the legal cause of this book. After all, so much detail about the law on gender-based violence in the earlier chapters matters not only when it speaks to/in the legalese, but when it directly relates to the lived reality of gender-based violence in fact. Law must respond to that reality, not to its own version of what we as lawyers call violence against women or gender-based violence. The constant reckoning with reality above and beyond the law is what defined Black women's contribution to intersectionality. If we take our cue from the roots of intersectionality theory which lie in critical race feminism, we will see that intersectionality cannot be so neatly separated in terms of its theory and praxis, and we would be left to engage with both as one. So, I wish that Sosa's important empirical work had spilled over some of the more clinical examinations of the law on gender-based violence and intersectionality covered in the earlier sections of the book.
Ultimately, the book leaves us with a sense that the legal landscape is rife with intersectionality-related norms which may or may not be employed in an intersectionality-friendly way. What the book shows us clearly is then this landscape of norms; while resisting the simplistic conclusion that this landscape itself guarantees that intersectionality has already been or can easily be translated into law, in this case, the law of genderbased violence.
11 The devil, as it always does, lies in the detail of how intersectionality is actually conceptualized, articulated, enforced and remedied in law. The book makes a significant contribution to the field in understanding this level of detail and in appreciating the complexity of accomplishing this task. 
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